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Fragments of a Consolatory Discours e: 





Aber ein Wesen, welches über einen so natürlichen Vorgang 
wie den des Todes anderer Organismen untröstlich sein 
kann, ist in ganz anderer Weise mit der Trostbedürftigkeit 
bis an den Grenzwert der Untröstlichkeit augestattet. 




he main title of this essay will no doubt to a great extent be self-
explanatory. As readers of this journal will have guessed, the 
reference is to Fragments d’un discours amoureux, Roland Barthes’ famous 
1977 book on what Richard Howard in his translation of 1978 has 
called ‘a lover’s discourse’: the book of his of which Barthes prophesied 
(wrongly, as it turned out) that it would become the most read of his 
works and the one that would be forgotten the soonest.3 In this 
contribution, I won’t be talking about the discourse of lovers, but about 
another cultural mode of speech, another doxa if you want, one of which 
I think it is possible to say that, in a number of important ways, it 
functions on the basis of principles that seem quite opposite to those 
underlying the discours amoureux as Barthes conceived of it, even though 
it is no doubt equally fragmented. The discourse or mode of speech that 
I will be dealing with is the discourse of what in English is called 
‘comfort’, ‘consolation’, ‘solace’, or even ‘consolement’. The language of 
Shakespeare seems to have at least four different, though in the latter 
three cases etymologically related, words for the type of speech that I 
will be talking about: the language that we use whenever we want to 
offer consolation to somebody who we think will benefit from the 
soothing effect ideally resulting from that language and from the specific 
mode of address that accompanies it – ‘lenient of grief and anxious 
thought’, as Milton puts it in a passage from Samson Agonistes that deals 
with the function and the effect of consolatory writings;4 it is the sort of 
language that we ourselves want to hear when we are in need of what 
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Samuel Johnson in his Dictionary of the English Language described as 
‘the alleviation of misery’ – his definition of what consolation is, a 
‘partial remedy’ as he hastens to add;5 it is the language whose rare 
occurrence and unique success the Scottish poet Don Paterson, in a 
beautiful poem that is entitled ‘Solace’ (and that is, in fact, a translation 
of poem number seventeen of the second half of Rilke’s Sonette an 
Orpheus), has compared to ‘rare, superb fruits that you stumble upon / in 
the trampled meadow of your loss’.6 Paterson’s wonderful image reflects 
on the fact that many are those who want to offer consolation to friends 
or strangers, but very few those who are really successful, while it also 
says something about the accidental nature of comfort – often, it is there 
when one least expects it. 
To be clear, my plan is not simply to try and imitate that quite 
inimitable project of Barthes’ Fragments d’un discours amoureux, although 
I have drawn an amount of inspiration from it that goes well beyond the 
phrasing of my title. What I will be presenting in this essay comes out of 
the preparations of a book-project that I have been working on for some 
time now and that in what, nevertheless, still seem to be the early stages 
of the book’s inception I would describe as a series of chapters in the 
interlocking histories of the Western concepts of ‘literature’ and of 
‘consolation’. What I’m aiming for in that book-in-(very-slow)-progress 
is a double Begriffsgeschichte: a conceptual history of consolation and one 
of literature. More precisely (because describing it as such makes it 
sound like an impossibly vast undertaking), I want to focus on specific 
moments in which the historical trajectories of those two concepts 
intersect. I’m interested in how those moments of intersection teach us 
something about the development of the two concepts, considered in 
isolation: the moments and the texts that I want to focus on teach us 
something about what literature is and can do, and they are also meant 
to teach us something about what consolation is and can do – or, rather, 
what literature and consolation were and what they could do.  
Let me give one immediate example of such a moment of 
intersection, one which might as well become the starting point of the 
book. In the past few years, it has struck me on several occasions that, 
both in reviews of books and in everyday conversations with both 
specialist and ‘amateur’ readers, the suggestion that a book can and does 
offer consolation occurs with surprising and increasing regularity. More 
often than not, the suggestion serves not just as a signal of the specific 
effect that books can have on readers and on reviewers, but also as a 
signal of the quality of these books. Just to give one recent example: in a 
recent survey article on ‘the rise of the medical humanities’,7 Belinda 
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Jack, in arguing for what she sees as a ‘less obvious role’ for poetry to 
play in the disciplinary field, refers to the power of poems to ‘console, 
teach, amuse, enlighten, mimic, disconcert and so much more’. What 
strikes me in Jack’s list of poetry’s tasks is not so much the presence of 
that first verb, but the fact that it is put there first, as the indication of 
poetry’s prime goal, so to speak, one that comes before the double 
Horatian imperative of teaching and amusement, of docere and delectare, 
the classical mixture of what is useful with what is pleasant. In the same 
paragraph, Jack further elaborates on what she sees as the specific 
consolatory function of poems. She does so primarily (and not entirely 
unexpectedly) by referring to the public use of poems at funeral services, 
where they serve as individual and collective occasions for all of those 
present, where, in Jack’s words, ‘[e]ach of us can ponder what the poem 
conjures for us, bringing something felt into clearer and thus more 
comforting focus. Often the poem will be one that allows us to 
reconsider the absolute nature of death.’ In other words: the comfort 
that the poem brings resides in the fact (‘thus’ being the signal of that 
specific causality) that the poem’s language and formal make-up allows 
us to see and understand more clearly something that we have been 
knowing and feeling all along (the absolute and inevitable nature of 
mortality), something that marks us as individuals, but which at the 
same time binds us together, collectively. The poet Don Paterson, to 
whom I referred earlier, in his preface to the Picador Book of Funeral 
Poems that he edited, describes the consolation provided by this type of 
poems in strikingly similar terms and he also singles out the specific 
consolatory function of some poems as their prime goal. This is how he 
puts it: ‘In our deepest grief we turn instinctively to poetry – to comfort 
and solace us, or to reflect our grief, give it proper public expression, or 
help us feel less alone in our experience of it. These poems, drawn from 
many different ages and cultures, remind us that the experience of 
parting is a timelessly human one: however lonely the loss of someone 
close might leave us, our mourning is also something that deeply unites 
us.’8 
In the international realm of literary criticism, the recurrence of 
the consolatory function of literary writings can also be related to the 
return of the idea of ‘bibliotherapy’ – a topic that I am sure Barthes 
would have had much to say about.9 The notion is of course a 
polysemous one, but I want to use it here in the specific sense of the 
reading practice or experience that is exemplified (and prescribed) in Ella 
Berthoud and Susan Elderkin’s The Novel Cure, a book that has now 
been translated into several international languages.10  In the brief preface 
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to their book, one and a half pages long, in which the authors try to 
explain that the ‘cure’ of the book’s title is obviously not a real medicinal 
remedy,11  the word ‘consolation’ is also invoked – not surprisingly, of 
course. It is mentioned in a paragraph in which Berthoud and Elderkin 
describe the effects of the literary prescriptions that the book as a whole 
lists: ‘Whatever your ailment’, they assure us, in the parlance of real 
doctors, ‘our prescriptions are simple: a novel (or two), to be read at 
regular intervals. Some treatments will lead to a complete cure. Others 
will simply offer solace, showing you that you are not alone. All will offer 
the temporary relief of your symptoms due to the power of literature to 
distract and transport.’12  The logic of the passage is quite 
straightforward: the fact that literature ‘simply’ provides comfort and the 
sort of comfort that it provides are coupled to its power ‘to distract and 
transport’ us, not to confront us with an absolute and threatening 
reality. Judging by several of the literary prescriptions that The Novel 
Cure offers, it would not be a farfetched idea to suggest that the literary 
solace that Berthoud and Elderkin are thinking of can be seen as a form 
of escapism, one which, however, procures the same effect as the funeral 
poems that both Belinda Jack and Don Paterson write about – the 
solace is a shared one, it results in the comforting thought ‘that you are 
not alone’.  
The function of objects of art to console is also conspicuously 
present in Art as Therapy by John Armstrong and Alain de Botton, in the 
context of whose School of Thought the editors of The Novel Cure give 
actual sessions in bibliotherapy. In their introduction to the co-authored 
book, Armstrong and De Botton write: ‘This book proposes that art (a 
category that includes works of design, architecture and craft) is a 
therapeutic medium that can help guide, exhort and console its viewers, 
enabling them to become better versions of themselves.’13  What I’m 
interested in, in the book that I hope to be able to finish one day, are 
questions that seem of lesser concern to the authors of Art as Therapy and 
The Novel Cure and that probe issues that seem to be taken as self-
evident by them: what is it, exactly, that we mean if we say – as they do, 
like many other readers, reviewers, authors and critics nowadays – that 
art consoles? What is this consolation by a work of art or by a fictional 
character? How is that we allow ourselves to be comforted by fictional 
characters when in real life we find it hard to be consoled by the words 
and deeds of those surrounding us? In what does this fictional 
consolation consist precisely and what is it exactly in these works that 
consoles us? Does the beauty of the work of art, its formal shape, have 
anything to do with this, and if so, to what extent and on the basis of 
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which textual and affective mechanisms? How, to come back to the 
sentence that I just quoted from Armstrong and De Botton, is a consoled 
person a better version of himself, especially a person who allows him- or 
herself to be consoled by a work of art?  
In the book that I’m trying to begin to write I will also be 
interested in how our contemporary ideas on the consolatory function of 
art relate to age-old discussions about the therapeutic powers of 
literature (or lack thereof) such as can be found in Plato’s Republic, 
where the critique of literature is carried out, at several points in the 
dialogue, by means of a comparison with the actual healing powers of 
medicine.14  The technè of medicine is one that really heals, whereas the 
art of poetry only leads to confusion, to the opposite of real, true and 
valuable knowledge. A similar critique of literature can be derived from 
the famous opening scene of Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae, 
where it is immediately made clear that in contrast to Philosophy, the 
muses of poetry do not provide us with consolation, or at least not with 
true consolation: rather than allow us to become better versions of 
ourselves, the muses’ work results in loss of the self.15  Fortunately, the 
history of the intersections of literature and consolation also provides 
arguments in favour of the comfort of fiction, as in Petrarch’s Invective 
contra medicum, where the opposite position is argued for and where a 
specific form of writing (we could call it literature, even though 
Petrarch’s apology for poetry is targeted towards a slightly different 
group of texts) is credited with qualities of a higher form of therapy than 
the merely physical one.16  The history of literature, from Dante on, 
provides numerous examples of this idea, and in the book I intend to 
discuss some of these examples, to begin with Dante, and his portrayal of 
Virgil in the Inferno as ‘il mio conforto’, the bringer of consolation.17  
The project that I have in mind is one in which I want to 
describe the cultural and hence, also, the historical nature of what at first 
sight seems to be a quite natural and maybe even universal human 
feeling, emotional value or affective status, much in the same way that 
the ‘feeling’ that Barthes wrote about in Fragments d’un discours 
amoureux seems to lack a history: the deep value that we attach to the 
human (and humane) power of consoling people, the cherished feeling of 
being consoled, the heartfelt need that we can have of being comforted, 
of wanting to be consoled, of feeling the need (if not always having the 
talent) to give comfort to others. As an aside, I just labelled this specific 
emotional complex as a typically human one: the German philosopher 
Hans Blumenberg, in what I consider one of the most marvellous recent 
analyses of the subject, argues that the need for comfort but also the fact 
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that it is hard, even almost impossible for us to be consoled 
(Trostbedürfnis und Untröstlichkeit des Menschen is the German title of his 
essay: ‘the need for consolation and the inconsolability of mankind’) is a 
constitutive category of mankind.18  In this, Blumenberg follows Georg 
Simmel, who in a fragment from his Nachlass that Blumenberg singles out 
suggests that to be human is to be in need of comfort. ‘Man’, Simmel 
writes, ‘is a living being on the outlook for consolation’,19  and this 
distinguishes human beings from animals: animals look for help, Simmel 
argues, and to ask for help is something quite different from being in 
need of consolation. Indeed, Simmel argues, we have invented the 
category of consolation because as human beings we are confronted 
throughout our physical existence with facts of life (such as the 
awareness of our mortality) which leave us helpless. ‘In the end’, Simmel 
writes, ‘man cannot be helped, and that is why he invented the 
wonderful category of consolation – an experience that not only derives 
from the words that people utter to that specific effect, but also from a 
myriad of worldly phenomena.’20   Simmel’s implicit conviction that 
animals cannot be consoled, only helped, is not completely disproven, I 
would say, by Franz de Waal’s conviction (expressed in his best-selling 
book The Age of Empathy) that chimpanzees, unlike ‘ordinary’ monkeys, 
have distinct ways of consoling each other – the distinction, according to 
De Waal, has to do with the fact that the latter (monkeys) are 
characterized by ‘an inability to adopt another’s point of view’.21  While 
I’m sure De Waal’s conclusion says something about the nature of 
monkeys, for me, more importantly, it also says something about the 
nature of modern ideas of consolation – the precondition of which is, 
exactly, that ability to empathize. 
Before I move on to explain what reading Roland Barthes added 
to my preliminary research on consolation, let me first, briefly, and also 
by way of an introduction to what will follow, give you a rough outline 
of two conceptual axes that will come to organize the ever-growing 
assembly of consolatory materials that I have so far in several notebooks 
and computer-files. First, there is a distinct historical focus to what I 
plan to write, decisively more than is the case in Barthes’ Fragments d’un 
discours amoureux. True, there are moments in his book when Barthes 
acknowledges historical determinations in and differences between 
specific discursive regions of the romantic discourse. This is, for instance 
the case when at the very beginning of the book he talks about the fact 
that ‘historically’,22  the lover who deplores ‘the absence’ of the object of 
his love is, Barthes claims, ‘miraculously feminized’.23  Yet, the book as a 
whole does not reflect to a large extent upon how our ideas of love, and 
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the speech in which we convey these ideas, both to ourselves and to the 
other whom we love, are the products of a specific set of historical 
developments. In the reflections on the language of consolation that I am 
preparing, there will definitely be more history, so to speak, because I am 
convinced that without a proper understanding of the historical 
ramifications of the discourse of consolation, it is very hard to begin the 
inquiry that interests me. Without wanting to elaborate too much on 
this, and, simultaneously, at the risk of generalizing too much, a proper 
understanding of what it is that we define as comfort, consolation or 
solace, will have to deal with the clear historical differences between 
what for the present purpose I will call pre-modern and modern ideas 
and economies of consolation. The immediate difference between the 
two becomes clear when as modern readers we come across a classical 
letter of consolation, such as the one that Plutarch wrote to console his 
wife upon the loss of one of their daughters. Consolation, here like in 
other examples from Cicero or Seneca, is primarily a matter of the mind, 
not the heart: the consolatory logic is one that is sustained and driven by 
rational argument, by an appeal to the common sense that claims that 
one should not be sad about the death of a child, but rejoice in the time 
that one knew this child and that one could share one’s live with it. ‘The 
fact that [the child] has gone to a place of no pain’, Plutarch writes, 
‘ought not to be a source of pain for us. Why should she cause us to 
suffer, if there is nothing that can now cause her pain?’24  I don’t even 
want to imagine what the effect would be if we quoted a line like this 
one in a letter of consolation to friends who went through a similar 
terrible ordeal – one which is obviously more uncommon in our days 
than in Plutarch’s, but which nevertheless occurs more often than we 
imagine. Bardamu, the narrator of Céline’s Voyage au bout de la nuit 
refers to Montaigne who, in writing a consolatory letter to his wife in 
similar circumstances, makes use of and refers to Plutarch’s example. In 
paraphrasing the letter, Céline has Bardamu parody Montaigne’s 
consolatory argument (‘Ah, my dear wife, don’t eat your heart out! 
Cheer up! … Everything will turn out all right !... It always does…’) , in 
a way that makes clear that the arguments of comfort that classical 
consolationes contain no longer function properly in the modern age.25  To 
see that, one could also compare Plutarch’s and Montaigne’s letters to 
Mallarmé’s ‘Notes pour un tombeau d’Anatole’, a text written in 1879 
at the occasion of the death of his eight-year-old son.26  
I’m aware of the fact that putting things as schematically as this 
begs the question when the modern age of comfort begins. Still, when I 
say that there are differences between pre-modern and modern 
 Jürgen Pieters 
	   130 
economies of consolation,27  I am obviously also thinking of questions 
having to do with the obvious difference between on the one hand 
classical and later Christian letters of or treatises on consolation (where 
religion, God himself, or ‘the gods’ themselves can be seen as either a 
source of comfort or a set of powers that deprive human beings from 
finding comfort and being consoled) and on the other hand the 
possibility (or impossibility) of consolation in a Godless, modern 
universe in which this specific source of religious comfort (or discomfort) 
is no longer present. Where do we find consolation if we no longer can 
say, like the eponymous hero of the book of Job, that God himself is our 
consolation? If we find consolation elsewhere, as I hope we do, is this 
consolation different in kind, in impact, in form? If we say, nowadays, 
that we find consolation in a work of fiction, is that in a way similar to 
saying that religious convictions can bring comfort?  
Secondly, the project will also be interested in the linguistic or 
rhetorical nature of consolation, in consolation as a speech act, one 
might say: in the sense that it will also look at the interesting question of 
what (at given moments and in specific cultural contexts) are the rules or 
principles that govern this speech act. What does an utterance of 
consolation, of comfort, have to do in order for it to be effective or 
successful? What are its ‘felicity conditions’, to borrow John Austin’s 
phrase?28  There is a clear ‘sincerity condition’ involved, for instance, in 
the sense that for words or utterances of consolation to work, it is 
important that the speaker be sincere, or maybe more importantly: that 
the receiver of the message (the person in need of comfort) be able to 
consider the speech act as being sincere, as coming straight from the 
heart and as taking into account the ‘authenticity’ of the sorrow for 
which the consolation is meant. (Though that sincerity condition in 
itself will not be enough: there are other ‘conditions’ that govern the 
speech act of consolation.) I’m particularly interested in how this speech 
act might be described in terms that Austin’s most famous student, John 
Searle, used in order to describe and analyse what he considered to be 
characteristic of the speech-act of fiction. Searle famously described 
fiction as ‘non-deceptive pseudo-statements’,29  which I think is what 
utterances of consolation also are in a certain way: they’re not really 
statements (of fact), but they’re surely not lies either: so they are non-
deceptive (i.e., if they want to succeed they have to be taken as non-
deceptive). But on the other hand, we don’t tend to think of words of 
comfort as being fictional, do we? And if we did, we would possibly no 
longer be able to see them as truly comforting? Or would we? Well, 
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those are some one of the questions that will be central to the book-
project or at least define its background. 
To be honest, Barthes’ Fragments d’un discours amoureux was not, 
initially, among the small library of essays that I was planning to read or 
reread when I began to think about this book. None of his texts actually 
were. The essay by Blumenberg that I just mentioned featured high on 
the modern section of my reading list, like the lucid essay that the 
Swedish author Stig Dagerman wrote just before he committed suicide 
on November 5th 1954 (‘Our Need for Consolation is Insatiable’, runs 
the title of the English translation);30  also on that part of the list was the 
epistolary exchange between Flaubert and George Sand from the end of 
1875, on whether the purpose of good literature is ‘consolation’ (as Sand 
argued) or ‘desolation’ (as Flaubert believed).31  The pre-modern, 
classical section of my library of consolation would have to contain the 
obvious suspects: the ‘consolatio ad uxorem’ by Plutarch, several 
consolatory writings by Seneca, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Boethius, 
of course, and Petrarch. 
Not Roland Barthes, surprisingly. Barthes only became part of 
my consolatory library after I received Neil Badmington’s kind invitation 
for a conference celebrating Barthes’ centenary. It was an invitation that 
– for several reasons that I won’t elaborate on here – was difficult to 
refuse, even though I had made myself promise (to promise to myself, 
moreover, which as you know are the hardest promises to keep) that in 
2015 I would only give papers or write pieces that would have something 
to do with my new book project. I was sure, however, that Barthes 
would have something inspiring to say about my topic – he had always 
done so on any of the other topics that I have written about in the past 
decade or so, whether it be the conversation with the dead,32  the 
dynamics of tradition and literary innovation in the so-called arrière-
garde or the prospect of writing a transnational literary history that is not 
dominated by the figure of the Author. Also, I vividly remembered a 
passage in Jeffrey Eugenides’ The Marriage Plot, in which one of the 
novel’s protagonists, Madeleine Hanna, was trying to fight a serious bout 
of heartbreak reading Barthes’ book, ‘the elegant prose’ of which, 
Eugenides’ narrator at one point assures us, ‘was her one consolation’.33  
All in all, my paper’s title in a way presented itself, given that what I had 
been collecting for my book for some time now, in the hope of later 
beginning to organize those materials, were actually fragments of a 
consolatory discourse – the sort of quotations that I could begin to 
organize and analyze in the way that Barthes did; if only I had the same 
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inventive and probing mind as the author of the Fragments d’un discours 
amoureux. 
As I suggested at the beginning of my essay, it should have come 
as no surprise that Barthes’ Fragments d’un discours amoureux contains 
very little reflection on the nature and functions of consolation. The 
languages of love and comfort, in the specific sense of the latter word 
that I am aiming for, seem to have very little in common in the 
framework of Barthes. I’m aware that I would have to develop this 
further, but for now, let me single out a few respects in which I see an 
obvious opposition between the romantic discourse of love as Barthes 
conceives of it in his Fragments and the discourse of consolation. The 
first difference has to do with the subject that is central to the two types 
of discourse, ‘le sujet d’énonciation’ if you want. In the discourse of 
comfort, this speaking subject is, to put it in the terms of the traditional 
communicative scheme, the sender of the message of comfort who uses 
language to address the receiver of the message of comfort; the success of 
the address can be measured in conventional rhetorical terms: if the 
sender of the message manages to convince the receiver of the truth-
value of the message, then the comforter has been successful and has 
realized what the discourse of comfort is made for: to take away a 
specific conception of the real that prevents someone who is in need of 
consolation to console him- or herself.  
The discourse of lovers as Barthes conceives of it is organized 
differently. In the majority of instances that Barthes deals with in his 
Fragments the discourse of love does not revolve around the transmission 
of messages by a sender to a receiver other than the sender. Actually, the 
discourse of love as Barthes conceives of it seems to be all about the 
impossibility and even the undesirability of that transmission. Before we 
begin reading his book, Barthes asks us to conceive of the words that we 
will be reading as being spoken by a subject in love: ‘so it is a lover who 
speaks and who says’ (‘c’est donc un amoureux qui parle et qui dit’, as 
we can read at the beginning of the French original34) – moreover, what 
this ‘amoureux’ is saying, he is apparently mostly saying to himself. The 
first three entries of Barthes’ lexicon already give a good idea of what I 
would call the discursive solipsism of the enunciating subject of the 
lover: the topic of the first entry, ‘s’abîmer’ is not coincidentally a 
reflexive verb (whose object is by definition its subject); the second entry 
deals with the central ‘absence’ of the loved one in the lover’s discourse, 
whereas the third entry (‘adorable’) revolves around the impossibility of 
the lover to find words to describe exactly what it is that singles out the 
loved one and that produces the feeling of love.35  
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‘Le sujet amoureux’, Barthes makes clear throughout A Lover’s 
Discourse, is a subject that speaks profusely, whereas the speaking subject 
in the discourse of consolation is more economic with words, to say the 
least; it is a subject that is listening more than it is speaking, and when it 
speaks it has to say the right thing, at least if the consolatory address 
wants to be successful. In the lover’s discourse there can only be love 
when this love is being spoken – love and speech require each other, they 
are each other’s conditions of possibility, whereas, as we all know, there 
can be comfort and consolation when nothing is actually said. The 
‘subject in love’, on the other hand, cannot not speak about what it feels 
and goes through, it has to express its love, and love is that which it 
expresses, albeit to itself rather than to the loved one. In order to make 
that clear, I want to move on to a passage from Alain de Botton’s novel 
Essays in Love, the writer’s debut, heavily influenced by Barthes’ A Lover’s 
Discourse, as De Botton has acknowledged on several occasions. Halfway 
through the novel, the narrator is reflecting on how he can best 
communicate his love to his girlfriend Chloe. He has bought her a red 
pullover (she preferred a blue one, but since he has kept the receipt, the 
bought goods can be exchanged quite easily), but since he suddenly 
realizes that he has never expressed his love to her verbally, he wants to 
add a card to the present and he wants to write on it something that 
expresses and conveys his deepest feelings to the subject of his worship. 
This is what he has to say about the language of love that should enable 
him to express these feelings but that, nevertheless, he keeps questioning:  
We could both speak of being in love, and yet this love 
might mean wholly different things within each of us. 
Sending out words of love was like firing a coded message 
with a faulty transmitter, always unsure of how it would be 
received [yet one nevertheless had to send, like the 
dandelion releasing numberless spores of which only a 
fraction would reproduce, a random, optimistic 
telecommunication effort – trust in the postal service].36  
It’s the second sentence of this passage that I want to think 
about for a second. Simply to replace ‘love’ by ‘comfort’ in that sentence 
would not necessarily lead to a problem: we have all been in situations in 
which we tried to console someone by saying specific things – well-
meant things, coming straight from the heart – but in which our good 
intention simply back-fired because our words meant ‘wholly different 
things’ for the one to whom we addressed them. Speaking words of 
comfort is, in that respect, not entirely unlike speaking words of love: 
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you never know how these words will be received. Still, the difference 
between the two discursive situations remains clear: I have just described 
the position of the ‘sujet d’énonciation’ of the ‘discours amoureux’ as 
solipsist, and this is confirmed, in a way, by De Botton’s suggestion that 
to the two protagonists of his novel love means different things ‘within’ 
each of them. The peculiar choice of word also underscores the point 
that the solipsism involves what I would call a ‘failed reciprocity’: for the 
discourse of love to be successful (though one would begin to wonder 
after reading Barthes if it ever can be successful, or, put differently, what 
its success could be) the two lovers would need to experience the same 
feeling simultaneously. In the discourse of consolation this is not the 
case: it seems to be quite essential that the comforter does not feel the 
exact same pain that the person being comforted experiences. It is, in 
fact, the difference in experience that allows for the specific measure of 
sym-pathy (‘feeling together’) that is involved in the successful practice 
of comfort that Hans Blumenberg, in his essay on the ‘need for 
consolation and the inconsolability of mankind’ that I have already 
referred to, describes as a process of ‘delegation’: in the practice of 
consolation, the comforter participates in the experience of grief that 
provokes the need for consolation in the other, without actually feeling 
the exact same grief – Blumenberg labels the process as one of what he 
calls ‘fictive diffusion’,37  whereby we delegate our pain to those who 
surround us and who then participate, by consoling us, in the 
‘alleviation’ (to borrow Samuel Johnson’s word again) of our suffering. 
Blumenberg labels the process ‘fictive’, because, as he rightly stresses, 
those who share in our pain do not really feel it: they play a role in the 
alleviation of our suffering without actually participating in it. 
The key word here is not solipsism, but solidarity, I would say, 
and it is this solidarity that functions as a prerequisite for the language of 
comfort to be successful: as long as the person whom we try to console 
or comfort does not think that we are genuinely participating in the grief 
that (s)he experiences, whatever words of comfort we try to express will 
fail to do their work. This is the case in one of the most iconic scenes of 
the failure of consolation to be found in the history of Western 
literature: Act One, Scene Two of William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a play 
that in my view deals centrally with the topic at hand. In that scene, 
both Gertrude and Claudius try to talk reason in Hamlet, and they do so 
by means of a number of topics that are prototypical of consolatory 
treatises that date from Antiquity and of which Cicero gives a survey in 
the third book of his Tusculan Disputations.38  They try to talk sense into 
Hamlet by arguing that the time has finally come to stop his mourning: 
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they urge him to realize that the death of his father, looked at from a 
sensible perspective, is nothing more than the course of nature. After all, 
as Gertrude famously puts it, ‘all that lives must die / Passing through 
nature to eternity’. If Hamlet does not arrive at that perspective, but 
rather, as his mother puts it, ‘forever with [his]vailed lids / seek for [his] 
noble father in the dust’, he will, in the words of Claudius that follow 
later in the conversation of the same scene, commit ‘a fault to heaven, / 
A fault against the dead, a fault to nature, / To reason most absurd.’39  As 
we all know, however, Gertrude and Claudius’ appeal to common sense 
does not work with Hamlet, for at least two complementary reasons: 
firstly because he obviously does not believe in the authenticity of the 
language that his mother and stepfather use (quite rightly so, in the case 
of the latter); and, secondly, because he simply does not want to be 
consoled.  
There is much more to be said about Hamlet and consolation, 
and I intend to do so in my book-in-progress, but now I want to move 
from the inconsolable Danish prince to the book by Barthes that 
followed the Fragments d’un discours amoureux : the book on photography 
that is also an ‘in memoriam’ for Henriette Binger, the author’s mother. 
It will be hardly surprising, I guess, that, in La Chambre claire, Barthes 
has as little to say about consolation as in the Fragments d’un discours 
amoureux. The book, after all, is written by one who without explicitly 
saying so does present himself as being largely inconsolable, the 
inconsolability having to do with the absence of the loved one.40  The 
book is the outcome of a period of mourning that follows upon the 
death of the author’s mother. As Barthes puts it in the Journal de deuil: 
the ‘livre sur la Photo’ was the result of an attempt ‘to integrate [his] 
suffering with [his] writing’ (‘d’intégrer mon chagrin à une écriture’41). 
Indeed, the actual writing of La chambre claire (15 April - 3 June 1979) 
coincides with the final months (and the last few pages) of the Journal de 
deuil, which Barthes had begun on 26 October 1977, his ‘first mourning 
night (première nuit de deuil)’42 , the day after his mother died in their 
apartment at 11 rue Servandoni, peacefully, at three thirty in the 
afternoon.43   
When I say that Barthes presents himself as inconsolable, both in 
the Mourning Diary and in La chambre claire, I am using that term in the 
specific meaning given to it by the Flemish philosopher Patricia de 
Martelaere, in an interesting essay about what she calls ‘the desire for 
inconsolability’.44  De Martelaere’s essay begins as a reflection on Freud’s 
famous 1917 text on ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (a text that features 
Hamlet at one point), but it develops into a reflection on what De 
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Martelaere (no doubt for reasons that have to do with her own 
biographical trajectory) labels ‘the interiorisation of the object of love’, 
by people who are ‘desperately in love’ – like the philosopher herself, I 
would be inclined to think.45  In a passage that I want to have a closer 
look at, she writes the following: ‘By becoming inconsolable, the 
melancholy one renders himself in a certain sense also invulnerable: there 
is nothing in the world outside that can make him unhappy, because he 
already is unhappy, in and of himself – he clings to his pain as the only, 
absolutely only thing that nobody can take away without his consent. 
The pain is what for the melancholy one replaces the object [of desire], 
it becomes his first and last, his dearest object, infinitely better and more 
preferable than any real object.’46  
De Martelaere’s description of the inconsolable mourner reminds 
me of another scene of consolation – of the failure of consolation, once 
more, as was the case with Hamlet – that Barthes recounts in his Journal 
de deuil: it is one of the entries dated 29 November (1977)  in which he 
explains to a certain AC (Antoine Compagnon, presumably) that the 
pain that the loss of his mother resulted in is ‘chaotic, erratic’ and 
therefore does not follow the regular process of what he calls ‘a 
mourning subject to time’: ‘becoming dialectical, wearing out. 
“adapting”’.  When AC reacts spontaneously that this is actually what 
mourning is all about (‘c’est ça, le deuil’), Barthes cannot but suffer from 
what he experiences as a painful generalization of his pain: ‘I can’t 
endure my suffering being reduced – being generalized – (à la 
Kierkegaard): it’s as if it were being stolen from me.’47  Mourning, as 
Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster put it in a reflection on Freud’s 
‘Mourning and Melancholia’, ‘demands a period of time that is 
absolutely individual’48  – it is this time that Barthes feels deprived of.  
The desire not to be consoled involves the attempt, De 
Martelaere argues, to prove the absolute nature of one’s love. To be able 
to go through a normal, regular process of mourning – one which comes 
to an end when the mourner decides that this time come has come – 
would take away the ‘happiness’ (so to speak) that results from what 
Barthes in his Mourning Diary describes as ‘living in one’s pain’: ‘I live in 
my suffering and that makes me happy. Anything that keeps me from 
living in my suffering is unbearable to me.’49  Just over one month after 
his mother’s death, Barthes wonders in his Mourning Diary whether the 
fact that he is able to continue life without her does not mean that he 
loved her less than he thought.50  The idea is typical of the inconsolable 
one, De Martelaere would argue. The example that she gives in her essay 
is Shakespeare’s Juliet: ‘What if Juliet, the inconsolable Juliet, would 
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have allowed herself to be comforted, after a decent period of mourning, 
and after some years would have found a different lover (...)?’, De 
Martelaere wonders. ‘That could only have meant that what she felt for 
Romeo was not Absolute Love (…) I don’t want to be comforted, the 
real Juliet says, I just want him back.’51   
There is one moment in La Chambre claire, one single passage, in 
which Barthes does refer to the possibility of consolation, of being 
consoled – or rather, and not surprisingly, to the fact that he, for the 
time being, is and remains inconsolable after the loss of his mother. The 
passage occurs in the vicinity of one of his reflections in the second part 
of the book, in which he talks about the famous photograph of his 
mother as a young girl, taken in 1898 at the Jardin d’Hiver of the 
parental house in Chennevières, where Henriette, then a five-year-old, 
was being photographed together with her brother, Philippe, who was 
two years older than she was.52  In the passage that I first want to have a 
look at, he is writing about photographic souvenirs that he has been 
going through in an attempt to recapture memories of his own 
childhood. But the attempt fails: in contrast to friends of his who were 
talking about cherished childhood memories, Barthes cannot but 
conclude that he no longer has them. What is more, it is looking at these 
photographs that took the memories away: ‘Surrounded by these 
photographs’, he writes, ‘I could no longer console myself with with 
Rilke’s line’,  and then he quotes one specific line from a love poem that 
Rilke wrote for Lou Andréas Salomé: ‘Aussi doux que le souvenir, les 
mimosas baignent la chambre.’ (‘Sweet as memory, the mimosas steep 
the bedroom.’)53  
I could no longer console myself by means of Rilke’s lines, 
Barthes writes: the sentence suggests two interconnected things/ideas 
that I would like to develop in the remainder of my essay. The first is 
that photographs, in the specific way that Barthes thinks about them in 
La Chambre claire, and at the specific moment in his life in which he is 
doing that thinking, do not bring comfort – and one has to wonder why 
that is the case. The second issue is that poetry, in this case a poem by 
Rilke, for Barthes, obviously does have the power to bring comfort – the 
fact that he says that this specific line no longer does console him, must 
mean that it once did. And it’s obviously something in the photographs 
(something desolate, one could say) that takes away the powers of 
comfort that Rilke’s poem used to have for Barthes. This brings me back 
to the question behind the book that I’m writing: What is it in literary 
texts that brings comfort? Why do we keep saying that they do? 
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Let me begin with the former question, which is probably the 
easiest one to answer on the basis of La Chambre claire: what is it in the 
photographs of his mother – in the portrait of a loved one who is no 
longer there – that makes it difficult for Barthes, at this specific time, to 
find comfort? The specific phase of mourning in which Barthes finds 
himself locked has something to do with it, obviously, but part of the 
answer also has to do with the ‘ontology’ (le tel) of the photograph, with 
what Barthes describes as the ‘painful labor’54  that these photographs 
impose (‘obligeait’) on him, in an act of what he calls real violence.55  Just 
before he writes about the line of Rilke’s poem, as I already said, Barthes 
discusses the famous photograph of the Jardin d’Hiver of which he had a 
reproduction made.56  Here is the famous passage in which he does so: 
 
I am alone with it, in front of it. The circle is closed, there 
is no escape. I suffer, motionless. Cruel, sterile deficiency: 
I cannot transform my grief, I cannot let my gaze drift; no 
culture will help me utter this suffering which I experience 
entirely on the level of the image’s finitude (this is why, 
despite its codes, I cannot read a photograph): the 
Photograph – my Photograph – is without culture: when it 
is painful, nothing in it can transform grief into 
mourning.57  
 The two italicized words in this passage – they are Barthes’ italics, by 
the way: ‘transform’ and ‘read’ – already hint at the point that I will want 
to make in the answer to my second question about the difference 
between photographs and literary texts, difference in view of those 
media’s respective consolatory potential, I will argue. The photograph 
cannot be read, Barthes says, it doesn’t seem to have the ability to 
provoke in the viewer (in this viewer at least) the power or the energy to 
transform the pain that he feels into something more productive, because 
it lacks the incentive to look elsewhere, to think differently, to imagine 
otherwise. To look at a photograph is painful because the photograph 
merely shows that which cannot be denied: the harsh reality of the 
mother no longer being there, whereas she once was, at the time at least 
when the photograph was taken. In that respect, Barthes begins to 
realize that in photographs like these there is a different sort of 
‘punctum’ at work than the one that he had been talking about in the 
discussion of the studium/punctum-concepts in the first half of his book. 
What the photograph of his mother as a five-year-old shows – what it 
painfully points out – is the ‘catastrophe’58  that any photo-portrait 
shows and that Barthes relates to Winnicott: it is a signal of the fact that 
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the catastrophe already took place: ‘he is going to die’59 , ‘she is going to 
die’;60  the punctum involves what Barthes labels ‘the discovery of the 
equivalence’ between ‘This will be’ and ‘This has been’61  – the photo 
shows a person who was alive at the time of its making but who now no 
longer is – it gives ‘an anterior future of which death is the stake’.62  
Back to my second question: what is it in literary texts that 
allows them to function differently from photographs, as 
sources/purveyors/producers of comfort? Judging by the longer passage 
that I just quoted from La Chambre claire the answer to that question 
should be related to a text’s transformative potential, the potential, that 
is of offering its reader a perspective that does not only allow for the 
transformation of the reading self but also of what it is that is being 
represented in the text. The answer should also be related, obviously, to 
the ‘medial’ difference between photographs and texts, between ‘l’Image’ 
and ‘l’écriture’. As Barthes puts it a few pages after the discussion of the 
Winter Garden photograph to which I referred earlier: ‘In the image, as 
Sartre says, the object yields itself wholly, and our vision of it is certain – 
contrary to the text or to other perceptions which give me the object in 
a vague, arguable manner, and therefore incite me to suspicions as to 
what I think I am seeing. This certitude is sovereign because I have the 
leisure to observe the photograph with intensity; but also, however long 
I extend this observation, it teaches me nothing. It is precisely in this 
arrest of interpretation that the Photograph’s certainty resides: I exhaust 
myself realizing that this has been (…).’63  Photographs bring to a halt our 
interpretive efforts, they do not need to be read or scrutinized for an 
implicit meaning, because their meaning is obvious and the effect of that 
conclusion is a deadeningly tiring, ‘exhuasting’ one (‘je m’épuise’,  
Barthes writes in the original). Writing, on the other hand, as Barthes 
famously puts it in the final paragraph of ‘On échoue toujours à parler de 
ce qu’on aime’, the text of his  that he had probably been typing out the 
morning of his near-fatal accident of Monday 25 February 1980, has the 
opposite effect – it is not exhausting (‘épuisant’), it is, rather, ‘a power’ 
(‘une puissance’), a form of empowerment, of energy, ‘probable fruit of a 
long initiation, which annuls the sterile immobility of the amorous 
image-repertoire and gives its adventure a symbolic generality’.64   
The first phrase that interests me in this passage is the one in 
which Barthes suggests that writing mobilizes – at least, it undoes the 
immobility of one’s imagination/imaginary. The phrase sounds like an 
echo of the passage on the photograph of the Winter Garden that I 
referred to earlier, in which Barthes recalls that sitting there in front of 
his mother’s picture made him suffer, ‘immobile’. The conjunction 
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between the two passages allows me to come to what sounds like a 
logical conclusion: Whereas photographs transfix you, render you 
immobile on account of their ‘flatness’,65  good writing, the writing that 
possesses the power that Barthes has been after for most of his career, 
will transform you: it will enable you to see things differently, to assume 
a new perspective, maybe to begin a new life, a ‘vita nuova’. Good 
writing, to give the ultimate Barthesian example would have to be 
Proust, I guess. Late July/early August 1978, Barthes is rereading Proust, 
as several entries in his Mourning Diary for that period show. Reading 
Proust reminds him of what the essence of literature is: ‘Which is what 
literature is: that I cannot read without pain, without choking on truth, 
everything Proust writes in his letters about sickness, courage, the death 
of his mother, his suffering, etc.’66  Whereas seeing photographs of his 
dead mother does not allow him to turn his pain into something else, 
Proust’s writing does seem to have an effect, whether it be letters by 
Proust on the death of his mother, or passages in the Recherche that deal 
with the death of the narrator’s grandmother. On that same day (1 
August), he writes that he comes to understand that his pain is ‘literally 
endurable’, if only because he is able to express it in language: ‘My 
culture, my taste for writing gives me this apotropaic or integrative 
power: I integrate integrate, by language. My suffering is inexpressible but 
all the same speakable. The very fact that language affords me the word 
‘intolerable’ immediately achieves a certain tolerance.’67  This is what 
language does, apparently: it takes away the absolute certainty of a fixed 
meaning: it opens up new pockets of signification, resulting from the 
possibility of even the slightest distance between what is stated 
(‘intolerable’) and what can be understood by the statement (‘a certain 
tolerance’). What language also does, the passage from the Mourning 
Diary seems to suggest, is that it socializes to a certain extent individual 
meanings and experiences, it invites us as individuals to become more 
than our singular selves, and to understand our experiences as having 
more than the idiosyncratic meaning that we single-mindedly see, 
without however nullifying our individual character. Barthes adds a 
footnote to his statement about the ‘integrative’ function of language: ‘I 
integrate – enter into a whole – federate – socialize, communize, 
gregoriate’.68  The footnote seems to echo some of the concerns that 
Barthes develops in his 1977 course at the Collège de France on the 
theme of ‘comment vivre ensemble’ (‘how to live together’), where he is 
clearly on the outlook for specific forms of ‘idiorrhytmic’ communality 
that do not impede the individual in the development of his or her 
individuality. The phrase is also important because it echoes what to me 
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is the programme of the Journal de deuil and La Chambre claire: Barthes’ 
attempt ‘d’intégrer [s]on chagrin à une écriture’ (‘to integrate [his] 
suffering with [his] writing’).69   
I want to come back, in that respect, to a second aspect of 
Barthes’ definition of writing in the final paragraph of his last text: 
writing, he states there, as we have seen, mobilizes and it does so by 
confronting our imaginary with what he calls ‘une généralité 
symbolique’.70  In the context of what I have been saying before, the 
word ‘généralité’ echoes the passage from the Mourning Diary that I 
quoted earlier and in which Barthes complained about one of his friends 
‘stealing’ away his pain from him by making generalizing remarks about 
the natural course of mourning. That type of generalization was negative 
in the sense that it deprived Barthes of something that he clearly wanted 
to call his own; while the ‘généralité symbolique’ that he talks about in 
his text on Stendhal, is positive, in the sense that it integrates – without 
reducing the integrity of one’s own experiences it reaches out to include 
those experiences in a more collective form – it allows one to see that 
the idiosyncrasies of our personal pain and our individual grief can be 
shared, in the way that we have seen Hans Blumenberg describe the 
mechanism of consolation, whereby we are enabled to ‘delegate’ our grief 
for others to share it in a mechanism of ‘fictive diffusion’. The fact that 
Blumenberg uses this particular adjective may well account for the 
feeling that many readers have that even characters in novels or films can 
give us comfort – and they often seem to do a better job at it than some 
actual people. Let me end with one final quotation, not from Barthes, 
but from Alain De Botton. The passage is taken from How Proust Can 
Change Your Life, a book which was also obviously heavily influenced by 
Barthes: 
  
After being abandoned by a lover who has expressed in the 
kindest way imaginable a need to spend a little more time 
on their own, how consoling to lie in bed and witness 
Proust’s narrator crystallizing the thought that, ‘When two 
people part it is the one who is not in love who makes the 
tender speeches.’ How comforting to witness a fictional 
person [who is also, miraculously, ourselves as we read] 
suffering the same agonies of a saccharine dismissal and, 
importantly, surviving.71  
 
There is much more to say and to be said about why literature functions 
in consolatory ways – why this particular form of language use that often 
provides us with the same wonderful reading experiences that Barthes 
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had (experiences that we often understand the better for his analysis of 
them) gives comfort. Given the time and the opportunity to pursue this 
issue further, I think I would introduce Barthes’ conception of literary 
texts as transitional objects in the discussion or reflect further on 
Barthes’ fascination for the figure of Orpheus, one of the recurrent 
heroes in the joint histories of literature and consolation. But I feel that 
it is about time to come, if not to a conclusion, then at least to a 
moment where I can, for the time being, round off the trajectory that I 
have followed in the course of this essay. Several of the fragments that I 
have commented upon in this text have provided us with one of the basic 
questions that underlie the discourse of consolation: should we take 
consolation, solace, comfort, consolement in terms of a confrontation 
with the real (whereby consolation involves our actual seeing the real as 
it is, and our being shown the real for what it actually is) or do we, 
rather, take comfort in the fact that the person who is trying to console 
us offers us a way to escape from a harsh reality? Of course, we did not 
need the example of Barthes to show us that the opposition, put in those 
straightforward binary terms, is in itself a reduction of the problem at 
hand. We probably no longer need his example to remind us of ideas 
that his work, for the past four decades, has put so decisively on the 
agenda of literary and cultural studies. I take comfort from the thought 
that that in itself may well be the most convincing proof of the enduring 
legacy of this 100-year-old. 
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